Explaining the immigrant integration laws of German, Italian and Spanish regions: Sub-state nationalism and multi-level party politics

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Abstract

How do sub-state regions respond to immigration and what drives their policy choices? Combining the cross-national literature on citizenship and integration policy with the literature on immigration federalism, I hypothesize that sub-state nationalism and multi-level party politics explain why some regions formulate more restrictive immigrant integration policies than others. Analysing integration laws of German, Italian, and Spanish regions demonstrates that socio-economically inclusive measures dominate, regardless of national context. Where restrictive provisions occur at all, they are associated with minority nationalism and the strength of anti-immigrant parties, while leftist regions facing right-wing national governments tend to adopt more inclusive policies.

Keywords

Immigrant integration policies; sub-state nationalism; party politics; Germany; Italy; Spain

JEL Codes

D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation

D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

Acknowledgments

1. Introduction

Public policies targeting immigrants come in three types: immigration, integration, and citizenship policies. The first define the conditions for crossing borders, the second for settling in the new environment and the third for becoming a full member of the political community (Helbling, 2016, p. 28, drawing on Hammar, 1990, p. 21).[i] Unlike immigration and citizenship policies, which are mostly decided at the national level, the integration of immigrants into the host society affects a range of policy areas within the jurisdiction of regional or local authorities (Manatschal, 2013, p. 27-32, see also Akgün & Tränhardt, 2001; Baglay & Nakache, 2014; Hepburn & Zapata-Barrero, 2014; Joppke & Seidle, 2012). As a consequence, policies that 'intend to guide and steer [...] integration processes of immigrants' (Penninx & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2016, p. 19) may vary considerably between territorial units nested within one and the same country.[ii] For example, Howard (2009, p. 6) tells us that five out of the nine Austrian provinces did not provide social assistance programs to non-citizens and Newton's (2018, p. 2096, fn. 12) analysis reveals that by 2013, seven out of the 50 US states were issuing driver's licences to undocumented immigrants.

For some time, authors have studied how local authorities steer processes of immigrant integration (e.g. Alexander, 2007; Caponio & Borkert, 2010). Regional integration policies in political systems with an intermediate layer of government have received less attention (Manatschal & Stadelmann-Steffen, 2013, p. 672; Newton, 2018, p. 2087; Schmidtke & Zaslove, 2014, p. 1870). This is surprising, given that key migrant destination countries such as the US, Canada, Germany and Switzerland are federations (Thränhardt, 2001, p. 21-22). The contributions that do exist have analysed the integration policies of selected regions, often within a single national context (e.g. Campomori & Caponio, 2017; Gebhardt, 2017; Schmidtke & Zaslove, 2014; Zapata-Barrero, 2004). Very few have systematically compared the integration policies of *all* regions within a given country (Adam, 2013; Manatschal, 2013;

Monogan, 2013; Newton, 2018) and comprehensive cross-regional and cross-country analyses are entirely absent.

This article's contribution is to systematically analyse regional integration policies across three European countries with a regional level of government. Comparing the legislative responses to migrant integration across autonomous communities in Spain (hereafter ACs), regions in Italy and German *Länder* allows me to explore why regions pursue more inclusive versus restrictive policy goals. Choosing different territorial regimes (a classical federation, a quasi-federation and an asymmetrically decentralized unitary state) with varying immigration trajectories (Spain and Italy as recent immigration countries, Germany as one of the 'magnet societies' of the post war period [Thränhardt, 2001, p. 21]) allows the charting of similarities that could point to a distinctive regional model of integration. At the same time, this case selection allows to explain regional differences in policy goals within each state.

By 2017, 19 out of 21 Italian regions (all but Molise and Sicilia) had adopted their own integration laws.[iii] Regions in Spain and Germany have rather steered integration through administrative plans. However, at the time of writing, the parliamentary assemblies of three Spanish ACs (Castilla y León, Valencia and Catalunya) and four German *Länder* (Berlin, Bayern, Baden-Württemberg and Nordrhein-Westfalen) had adopted integration laws. This article focuses on integration laws since they set the programmatic frame for more detailed, transversal measures defined in integration plans and regional legislation in related policy areas such as education, housing and social welfare.

The next chapter introduces the theoretical framework, which, in the absence of ready-made theories explaining regional policy, draws on the comparative literature addressing national citizenship and integration policy, and the literature on immigration federalism in the US. I hypothesize that sub-state nationalism and multi-level party politics explain why some regions formulate more restrictive integration policies than others. Section three presents the

research design employed to test these expectations and introduces the rationale for case selection. Section four compares the conditions that regions set for integrating newcomers politically, socio-economically and culturally. I find that socio-economically inclusive measures dominate, regardless of national context. Where restrictive provisions occur at all, they are associated with minority nationalism and the strength of anti-immigrant parties. The cross-level constellation of party competition is also important: When leftist regions face ideologically incongruent national governments, they become more likely to adopt inclusive policies. The fifth and final section concludes the article.

2. Theory and hypotheses

Following Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas (2016, p. 19), I define immigrant integration policies as those that 'intend to guide and steer […] integration processes of immigrants'. Following a range of scholars (e.g. Joppke & Seidle, 2012, p. 9; Manatschal et al., this Special Issue, Penninx & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2016, p. 11), I classify these policies into three domains based on Entzinger's (2000) argument that integration policies regulate immigrants' access to the state, the market, and the nation:

1. Political-legal integration policies (access to the state),

2. Socio-economic integration policies (access to the market).

3. Cultural-religious integration policies (access to the nation),

Helbling (2016, p. 34) recently concluded that 'so far there are very few studies that aim to explain the variation of policies across countries and time'. Nevertheless, some explanations have been brought forward, often invoking the historical legacies of colonialism, of a settler versus a non-settler past, or of the timing of nation-building in relation to democratization (Janoski, 2010; Koopmans et al., 2012; Koopmans & Michalowski, 2017). Explanations for

changes over time tend toward party politics and the success of the anti-immigrant radical right in particular (e.g. Howard, 2009; Lutz, 2018).

An analogy to nation-states is arguably more apt for regions that are home to sub-state nations, like Scotland in the UK or Catalunya in Spain. These groups could be characterized as extreme cases of 'late-comer nations' (Kohn, 1944) or 'state-seeking nations' (Tilly, 1994), since nation-building processes are still ongoing. According to the literature on citizenship policies, state-led nations make it easier for those with a different ethnic/cultural background to join the nation than state-seeking nations. If the claim for a state is made on behalf of a nation that is already constructed as a bounded cultural group, the resulting state's policies towards ethnic or cultural others tend to be more restrictive than if the formation of the state preceded the construction of the nation. In the latter case, the diversity of the state's population was already in place and could not be reimagined as culturally homogenous. In short, if the nation comes before the state, policies will be more restrictive; if the state comes before the nation, policies will be more inclusive (Koopmans & Michalowski, 2017, p. 43, drawing on Kohn [1944] and Tilly [1994]).[iv]

Based on this analogy, regions where sub-state nationalism (of the state-seeking type) is thriving can be expected to put more emphasis on symbolic aspects of cultural-religious integration, and to be overall more restrictive in their policies towards newcomers. Sub-state nationalism is 'after all, a nationalism defined by something other than inherited boundaries and institutions. Ethnic and cultural diversity is therefore a special challenge to sub-state nationalism. And conversely, sub-state nationalism must naturally be a special challenge to ethnic and cultural diversity within its "national" homeland' (Hussain and Miller, 2006, p. 2).[v]

On the other hand, party politics should matter in any region, independent of whether it is home to a stateless nation or not. There is no theoretical reason why party political factors found to explain cross-national variance in policies should not also account for policy

variance at the regional level. As coherently summarised by Lutz (2018, p. 3), radical right parties with restrictive stances on immigration and a preference for exclusionist migrant policies can influence immigration and integration policy both directly, and indirectly. Direct influence occurs when radical right parties enter governments and propose their preferred policies. Indirect influence occurs when mainstream parties (in particular those of the center-right) adopt restrictive policies in order to avoid losing votes to their more radical challengers. This is in line with Howard's (2009) analysis, showing that successful mobilization of anti-immigrant sentiment through far-right parties prevented governments of any colour from liberalizing restrictive citizenship laws.

Factors discussed so far lead one to predict regional integration policies with regional variables, replicating the findings of cross-national studies. However, regional policy-makers states form part of a system of interdependent jurisdictions. In addition to characteristics of the region, we therefore need to consider how *relations* between political actors across governmental levels affect policy choices (Filomeno, 2017). Based on a study of state-level policies in the US, Newton (2018) argues that at times when immigration legislation is dead-locked in the US congress, immigration policy is politicised at the regional level. Some states opt for more restrictive, others for more inclusive legislation, and state legislators deliberately choose to go against or support a given national policy—depending on congruence or incongruence in the partisan composition of national and state governments.

Summarizing these insights, we can therefore formulate a first hypothesis based on arguments about state-seeking nationalism, a second set of hypotheses based on arguments about regional party politics, and a third set of hypotheses accounting for the relational logic of multi-level party politics:

H1. The more successful sub-state nationalist parties, the less inclusive regional integration policy.

H2a. The more successful anti-immigrant parties, the less inclusive regional integration policy.

H2b. Regional governments including anti-immigrant parties adopt less inclusive regional integration policy.

H2c. Right-wing regional governments adopt less inclusive regional integration policy.

H3a. *Right*-wing regional governments facing *left*-wing national governments adopt less inclusive policy.

H3b. *Left*-wing regional governments facing *right*-wing national governments adopt more inclusive regional integration policy.

3. Research design, case selection and introduction to cases

The goal of this paper is to systematically compare regional integration policies across different national settings and explore which predictors are systematically correlated with more inclusive and more exclusive policies. The design probes whether differences in regional policies are associated with minority nationalism and/or regional government's ideology and pressure from right wing parties, and whether government incongruence across levels, an important predictor of state-level policies in the US, plays a similar role in Europe. At the same time, studying regional policies across different countries highlights the similarities that exist despite different territorial regimes and migration histories.

While it seems natural to expect regional policy differences in federations such as Germany, regional authorities can also steer integration processes in quasi-federal and unitary decentralized systems like Spain and Italy. Several authors have studied the integration policies of *selected* regions within these countries (Campomori & Caponio, 2017, on Lombardia, Piemonte & Emilia-Romagna; Gebhardt, 2017, and Zapata-Barrero, 2004, on

Andalucía, Catalunya and Madrid; Jeram, 2014, on Catalunya and País Vasco; Medda-Windischer, 2016, on Bolzano and Valle d'Aosta; Medda-Windischer & Carlà, 2015, on Bolzano and Catalunya; Schmidtke & Zaslove, 2014, on Nordrhein-Westfalen and Emilia-Romagna). A systematic analysis explaining *all* regional integration laws in any of these three countries has, to the best of my knowledge, not been undertaken.[vi]

In terms of the broader context of immigration, Italy and Spain have similar settings, while Germany has a different history. Italy and Spain used to be emigrant countries and only began to transform into immigration countries in the mid-1980s. Immigration rates did not become significant until the 2000s and have been developing unevenly across regions (see Appendix A). By contrast, Germany has a longer history of immigration, dating back to the guest worker regime set up to steer labour migration in the 1960s. Due to settlement processes and family reunification, this marked the beginning of the transformation of Germany into one of the world's key immigration destinations (Thränhardt, 2001, p. 21). Finding similar tendencies across these different systems would constitute strong evidence for more general regional integration policy trends.

Three of the 17 Spanish ACs, 19 of the 21 Italian regions (counting Trento and Bolzano separately) and four of the 16 German *Länder* have regional integration laws. The medium-sized N of 26 laws allows for OLS regression analysis, provided that careful post-regression diagnostics are performed (Jann, 2009). Regression analysis can systematically summarize patterns of association between explanatory factors and regional integration policy characteristics in a first plausibility probe of this article's hypotheses.

In all three countries, setting the conditions for immigration and naturalization (i.e. for entering the country and for acquiring citizenship) rests exclusively with the state. In Spain and Italy, the right to define the modalities for immigrants' access to education, housing, social services and the labour market lies with the regions (Wilhelmi, 2013, p. 16).[vii] In

Germany, the social security system (including unemployment benefits, health care and family allowances) is nationally unified (Bommes & Kolb, 2012, p. 117). However, law enforcement, education, cultural policy and religion are exclusive competencies of the *Länder* (Kaiser & Vogel, 2019), allowing for distinctive legislation in key areas of immigrant integration.

Italy's first regional integration laws were produced in the 1970s and predominantly targeted the socio-economic inclusion of returning *emigrants*. The earliest laws dealing *simultaneously* with returning emigrants and newly arriving immigrants were those of Marche (1975) and Piemonte (1978) (see Appendix B), though the implementation of these early laws was weak (Wilhelmi, 2013, p. 18). Regional legislators began separating newcomers from returners during the 1990s and 2000s, leading to a series of laws exclusively addressing the integration of immigrants. At the time of writing, only two Italian regions have yet to produce a regional law targeting immigrant integration: Molise and Sicilia, two regions with a low share of immigrants. In cases where an Italian region produced several laws over time, I analysed the most recent law, i.e. the one still in force.[viii]

Since the mid-1990s, Spanish ACs had been dealing with immigrant integration in a bottom-up manner and on a day-to-day basis. The incorporation of migrants into the host society touched upon areas that already lay within the realm of their jurisdiction, e.g. housing, employment or education (Franco-Guillén 2018, p. 5). However, in contrast to vivid and early regional legislative activity in Italy, most Spanish ACs refrained from drafting laws. Castilla y León and Valencia have laws explicitly addressing immigrant *integration*, while Catalunya made a law governing the reception of immigrants (see Appendix B). The Catalan law, however, is similar in substance to the other laws and can therefore be included in this comparative analysis. With the exception of Ceuta and Melilla, all ACs have integration plans structuring governance of this area, and they are usually updated every four or five years

(Iglesias de Ussel 2010). But these are administrative plans, not legislative decisions. They tend to outline inclusive measures aimed at supporting integration processes and do not specify any restrictions. Therefore they have not been included in this analysis to avoid introducing potential bias.[ix]

While Germany has been a *de facto* country of immigration since the 1970s, political elites still debate whether Germany can and should be characterized as such. The reluctance to acknowledge the realities of immigration may explain why the national government, as well as regional governments, hesitated to adopt integration measures during the early phases of immigration, leaving the initiative to local actors (Bommes & Kolb, 2012, p. 116). The German state finally came to define explicit integration measures in the form of obligatory civic integration courses as part of the Residence Act of 30 July 2004.[x] The federalism reform of 2006 strengthened the role of the *Länder* in education policy targeting 1st, 2nd and now also 3rd generation immigrant children, ensuring that 'the *Länder* are, more than ever, the venue for steering integration processes' (Bommes & Kolb, 2012, p. 129). By 2017, four out of 16 German *Länder* had integration laws (see Appendix B), namely Berlin, Bayern, Baden-Württemberg and Nordrhein-Westfalen. Brandenburg has undertaken preliminary work, tasking its parliamentary advisory service with preparing a document summarizing the legal issues involved in making a regional integration law (Landtag Brandenburg, 2016) but so far, no legislative proposal has come forward. Only the Bavarian law carries the title of 'integration law'. The other three laws mention integration in their titles, but emphasize more general principles of empowering newcomers, be it in terms of equal opportunities (Baden-Württemberg) or participation (Berlin and Nordrhein-Westfalen). Like in Spain, governments of German *Länder* without integration laws issue administrative guidelines (see Gesemann & Roth, 2015, p. 57-60).

The fact that Italian regions engaged in legislative activity shortly after the very creation of regional assemblies in the 1970s, while German regional assemblies did not begin to legislate in this area until 2010, indicates that long-standing territorial autonomy or a formally federal system do not account for the timing or intensity of regional integration policy-making. However, this also implies that the different socio-structural conditions that characterize the time at which laws are adopted have to be accounted for in the comparative analysis. To account for over-time differences, lagged controls for the share of the foreign-born population and regional GDP per capita were included into the analysis.

A further concern is that regions' initial choice of whether to adopt an integration law or not might be influenced by factors correlated with the outcome of inclusive or exclusive policies, thereby causing selection bias. In Italy, the selection is almost complete, but in Germany and Spain, most regions have not adopted integration laws. Fortunately, regions that have adopted laws are neither systematically more left, nor more right than those that have not adopted laws. We further find regions with a high and a low share of minority nationalist parties among those that did adopt laws (e.g. Catalunya with 51% of seats won by minority nationalists, versus Castilla y León with only 2.41%) and among those that did not (e.g. the Basque country, where minority nationalists gain around 50% of seats on average, versus La Rioja, where the Partido Riojano gains around 6% of seats).

4. Analysing regional integration laws

Integration policies of regions in Italy, Spain and Germany are operationalized by content-analysing regional integration laws.[xi] The aim is to establish which regions pursue more inclusive or restrictive policy goals in their integration laws, which in turn inform and structure more concrete policies in this area. This is different from projects like MIPEX (Huddleston et. al., 2015), which code the presence or absence of concrete integration

measures based on a survey of country experts, accounting for legislation and administrative acts across sectors.

Two coders went independently through each law, coding each sentence under one and only one of a set of mutually exclusive categories. The key goal was to identify integration policy measures and interpret their intention. Therefore, sentences specifying integration policy measures were classified by *domain* (socio-economic, political-legal or cultural-religious integration) and *intention* (inclusion or exclusion). The coding frame draws on the conceptualisation of integration policy by Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas (2016) and is summarised in Figure 1. Categories used for more inclusive measures are shaded in light grey, those for more exclusive measures in dark grey. The three domains are shaded in black. Inclusive measures in the socio-economic domain are those that treat immigrants in a differential, but favourable way compared to the host population to help them even out unequal starting conditions (code *'socio-economic, differential favourable'*). For example, the Berlin law asks universities to encourage members of underrepresented societal groups to enter higher education. Conversely, exclusive socio-economic measures are those disadvantaging immigrants (code '*socio-economic, differential unfavourable'*), for example when Bolzano makes access to regional social welfare conditional on a five-year-period of residence. Sentences specifying that immigrants should be treated equally in the socio-economic domain received the code '*socio-economic, equal treatment'*.

In the political-legal domain, inclusive measures seek to enable immigrants to exercise their rights and be represented in regional politics (code *'political-legal, enabling'*), whereas exclusive measures seek to restrict immigrants' rights and their political representation (code *'political-legal, restrictive'*). For example, the laws of Emilia-Romagna, Liguria and Toscana favour extending the voting rights of immigrants, which is coded as *political-legal, enabling*. For measures that fall into the cultural-religious domain, an inclusive intention was given if

measures promoted cultural pluralism, acknowledging the valuable contribution of different cultures for a diverse regional society (code *'cultural-religious, pluralism'*). An exclusive intention was coded for one-sided promotion of the host culture or religion, pursuing a 'monist' rather than a pluralist vision of societal culture (code *'cultural-religious, monism'*). For example, Bavaria's law supports educational measures inspired by the German 'leading culture' (*Leitkultur*), which is coded as *cultural-religious, monism*. Sentences that could be classified into a domain, but had a neutral intention were classified as '*residual*'.

A perfectly inclusive integration policy would only define measures aimed at enabling immigrants to exercise their political rights, treating them favourably in the socio-economic domain and encouraging a pluralist vision of the regional culture. Conversely, a perfectly exclusive policy would only define measures restricting immigrants' political participation and realization of their rights, treating them unfavourably in the socio-economic domain and imposing a monist vision of the regional culture. More details on how the categories were developed, a discussion of inter-coder reliability and a full version of the coding manual can be found in Appendix C.[xii]

Figure 1. Coding frame for content analysis of integration laws, main categories

Note: light grey indicates inclusive, dark grey indicates exclusive categories. Residual categories do not have a direction

Figure 2 plots the mean number of sentences coded under each category across all laws by country. Inclusive measures dominate decisively over exclusive ones. On average, laws in all three countries prioritize favourable measures fostering immigrants' socio-economic integration. [xiii] Regions' second priority is to enable migrants' political participation and to inform them about their rights. Germany distinguishes itself from Italy and Spain in that in the German laws, unfavourable measures dominate those stipulating equal treatment of immigrants and natives in the socio-economic domain. This result is, however, driven by the Bavarian law, illustrating the necessity to disaggregate the analysis to individual regions.

Figure 2. Number of measures by category, country averages, Italy: 19 laws, Spain: 3 laws, Germany: 4 laws

Disaggregating to individual regions, interesting variance can be observed across restrictive socio-economic measures (e.g. making access to social welfare conditional on years of residence, as in Bolzano, or imposing a fine on immigrants failing to show up for integration

15

courses, as in Bavaria) and the culturally monist measures (e.g. references to German and Christian *Leitkultur* in Bavaria's law). Regional use of these two exclusive categories is plotted in Figure 3. Most regions refrain entirely from taking any measures that treat immigrants unfavourably, but the wealthy regions of Bolzano in Italy and Bavaria in Germany stand out with a number of such socio-economic measures. Turning to the cultural-religious domain, Bavaria is still among the most restrictive regions, however, the front-runner in this domain is the Catalan law which places strong emphasis on the Catalan language and culture, thus demonstrating an ideal of cultural integration that tends to the assimilationist type (cf. Jeram, 2014; Zuber 2014).

Figure 3. Number of unfavourable measures in the socio-economic and monist measures in the cultural-religious domain by region

Regions thus display some common characteristics in that their laws predominantly favour immigrants' socio-economic integration and enable them to participate politically and be informed about their rights. Nonetheless, we still find interesting variance between regions. This variance shall now be assessed through multivariate regression analyses.

To this aim, I created five continuous dependent variables because regions can decide to include *both* inclusive and exclusive measures in their laws, and predictors may differ, as Filindra (2018) has shown for state level policies in the US. The inclusive set consists of: *enabling* (political-legal measures), *favourable* (socio-economic measures) and *pluralist* (cultural-religious measures). The exclusive set consists of: *unfavourable* (socio-economic) and *monist* (cultural-religious). With only two statements coded as restrictive, it is not possible to analyse *restrictive* (political-legal measures) as a dependent variable.

Since laws were adopted in different years, I measure the independent variables at a point in time prior to the adoption of the respective law. The first hypothesis states that minority nationalism is associated with a more restrictive approach. I measure minority nationalism through the summed seat share of sub-state nationalist parties resulting from the regional election predating the integration law (variable *minority nationalist*). For example, the Catalan law was adopted in May 2010. The most recent election had taken place in November 2006, so I added the seat shares of minority nationalist parties following the 2006 election. Parties were classified following the appendix to Massetti and Schakel (2016) with the exception of the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) in Germany. Massetti and Schakel exclude CSU because of permanent electoral cooperation with the Christian Conservatives (CDU). However, Hepburn (2008) showed that despite its alliance with a state-wide party, the CSU exposes a Bavarian minority nationalist profile. I therefore categorise CSU as a minority-nationalist party.[xiv] More detail on the coding can be found in Appendix E.

For the mobilization of anti-immigrant sentiment, I used the summed seat shares of political parties classified as anti-immigrant according to van Spanje (2011), again following results of the regional election *predating* the respective integration law (variable *anti-immigrant*). Van Spanje (2011, p. 311) summarizes expert surveys covering the period 1990-2004 and classifies parties as anti-immigrant if they had a position of 8 or higher on a scale ranging from 0 to 10, where 10 denotes a position strongly in favour of a restrictive immigration policy. For laws adopted after 2004, I consulted the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et. al., 2015; Polk et. al., 2017), using the same criterion as van Spanje (for detail, see Appendix F). I further coded whether a party with a restrictive position on immigration was included in the government at the time a regional law was adopted. This was the case only in South Tyrol (SVP) and Bavaria (CSU). The content of these two laws is in line with the theoretical expectation, since they are among the most restrictive ones (see figure 3) but with only two positive cases, there is not enough variance to test hypothesis 2b in the regression analysis.

Hypothesis 2c requires measures of the ideology of the regional government at the time the law was passed. The dummy variable *right wing government* takes the value 1 if the regional government consisted of a coalition of centre-right and/or right wing parties at the time the law was passed, and 0 otherwise.

Only one law was adopted by a *right*-wing regional government confronting a *left*-wing national government: Valencia's law was proposed by the regional branch of the Spanish People's Party in December 2008 when the Social Democrats were governing at the national level. The Valencian law is indeed among the less inclusive ones, but with only one case, there is not enough variance to test this constellation in the regression analysis. Conversely, *left*-wing regional governments confronted *right*-wing national governments in eight out of the 26 cases, allowing me to test relational hypothesis H3b with a corresponding dummy variable. The composition of regional governments was coded based on data by Röth and

Kaiser (2018); information on national governments was taken from the ParlGov database (Döring & Manow, 2018).

I include two control variables, the share of foreign-born in the regional population (collected from national statistical offices), and regional GDP per capita[xv] (both lagged by one year respective to the year in which a law was adopted). The presence of higher shares of immigrants in the regional population could be a common cause of support for anti-immigrant parties and restrictive integration measures in the laws, at least if we assume a mechanism of group threat (e.g. Filindra 2013). Likewise, GDP per capita is included because whether a region is poorer or richer may affect both regional party politics and the extent to which integration laws grant immigrants access to social welfare.

Table 1 presents the results of OLS regressions of the content of regional integration laws on the seat shares of minority nationalist and anti-immigrant parties, the ideology of regional governments, incongruence between national and regional governments, and controls.

** About here: Table 1. Results of OLS regression analyses of the content of regional integration laws **

With only 26 regions nested in three countries results could be affected by influential outliers, or clustering. Table 1 therefore presents two models for each of the five dependent variables: one without and one with country dummies for Spain and Germany, taking Italy as the reference group.[xvi] Post regression diagnostics showed Bavaria (Germany) to be an influential outlier (that is, an observation with both high leverage and a large squared residual, see Jann [2009]) in the regressions explaining unfavourable and culturally monist measures, and Bavaria and Bolzano in the regressions explaining monist measures.[xvii] Bavaria opted for an

atypically restrictive integration law, given its values on the independent variables,[xviii] whereas Bolzano's law was less monist than the values on the independent variables would predict. As a further robustness check, the models explaining unfavourable measures were therefore estimated without Bavaria, and the models explaining monist measures were estimated without Bavaria and Bolzano (see Appendix D).

The full models explain between 49% (*favourable*) and 82% (*unfavourable*) of the variance in the number of inclusive and exclusive measures adopted in the integration laws, indicating a very good fit. Hypothesis 1, which expected sub-state nationalist regions to be more restrictive than ordinary regions, receives support. The seat share of minority nationalist parties is negatively associated with the number of inclusive statements in all three domains, and is positively associated with unfavourable measures in the socio-economic domain, though surprisingly not with monist measures in the cultural-religious domain. Sub-state nationalist regions opt for fewer measures explicitly encouraging a pluralist, multicultural approach, but are not significantly more likely to adopt a monist approach than regions with lower sub-state nationalist mobilization. This finding is robust to the inclusion of country dummies, as well as to the exclusion of Bavaria (see Appendix D).

Hypotheses 2a and 2b expected a higher degree of anti-immigrant mobilization and right-wing governments to lead to less inclusive policy. Here, the evidence is mixed and the findings emphasize the need to analyse exclusive and inclusive measures separately (Filindra 2018), rather than in the form of a composite index as is often done in comparative migration research (e.g. when using data from the MIPEX project, see Huddleston et. al., 2015). Counter-intuitively, the seat shares of anti-immigrant parties in regional parliaments are positively associated with enabling measures, but the effect is not robust to the inclusion of country dummies. Both anti-immigrant mobilization and a right-wing ideology of the regional government are positively and significantly associated with the number of measures that treat

immigrants unfavourably in the socio-economic domain, and anti-immigrant seat share is associated also with a higher number of monist measures. However, these effects are no longer significant at the conventional 5% level when Bavaria is excluded (see Appendix D).

Interaction between political parties across levels also plays a role: When regions governed by left-wing coalitions adopt integration laws while the centre is governed by their political opponents, their laws tend to have more enabling and fewer monist provisions. The effect is robust to the exclusion of Bavaria and Bolzano (see Appendix D). Regions' economic capabilities correlate with the number of inclusive measures in either domain while the share of the *foreign-born* population never has a significant coefficient .

In sum, the results show that minority regions indeed display a more restrictive, more unfavourable, and less pluralist approach to immigrant integration than other regions, but are no more likely to adopt monist measures. Higher seat shares of anti-immigrant parties are associated with unfavourable treatment of immigrants in the socio-economic domain, and a more assimilationist approach in the cultural-religious domain, but not with a lower share of inclusive measures across domains.

5. Conclusion and outlook

This article started from the observation that in political systems with an intermediate layer of government, the regional level tends to have jurisdiction over immigrant integration. The policy choices of regional governments deserve scholarly attention because they can lead to territorial inequalities in the living conditions of immigrants (Newton, 2018, p. 2087).

The content analysis of 26 regional integration laws in Germany, Italy, and Spain, three European countries with different territorial regimes and different immigration histories, shows that regions focus mostly on the socio-economic dimension of integration, attending to

education, housing, health care and the intercultural opening of public services. Regions seek to foster newcomers' participation in the regional society through favourable socio-economic measures, as well as through measures enabling their representation and participation in regional politics. However, some regions also aim to ensure that newcomers adopt the dominant culture and try to differentiate immigrants' and natives' level of access to social welfare. The multivariate analyses show that in particular regions with minority nationalism—by definition a nationalism of the state-seeking kind—adopt fewer inclusive and more restrictive measures. Anti-immigrant mobilization covaries with restrictive measures in the socio-economic domain, but is not associated with fewer inclusive measures. Confronting a national government of political opponents correlates with a higher share of enabling, and a lower share of assimilationist provisions in laws adopted by leftist regional governments, showing that not only regional, but also multi-level party politics matters. Economic resources matter for how much effort regions put into accommodating immigrants' needs inclusively, while exclusive measures are unrelated to regions' GDP per capita. These patterns underline the need to study inclusive and exclusive measures separately (Filindra, 2018, Filindra and Manatschal, this Special Issue).

With a total of 26 laws adopted between 1975 and 2015, the scope of the multivariate analysis remains limited and can only serve as a first plausibility probe of the hypotheses. Nonetheless, the findings provide the first systematic cross-regional *and* cross-country analysis of regional immigrant integration laws to date. Given that the coding scheme has proven to be applicable to laws from three different national contexts, I hope that it will inspire further comparative work, especially since regions are further expanding their legislative activity in this area (Manatschal et al., this Special Issue).

Ultimately, however, an analysis of integration policy *goals* remains somewhat detached from reality. To the recipients of the policy, it matters more how services are being delivered and

how easily rights can be accessed in practice. Studying regions' intentions as declared in their policy documents needs to eventually be complemented with an analysis of implementation—looking, for example, at whether the regional immigration councils foreseen in a number of laws were ever established, and who participates in them. As Ireland (2016, p. 383) states, 'concepts and models should be reassessed against empirical evidence gathered from observing legislation and programs as they are actually carried out and lived'. Nevertheless, the analysis of regional legislation in this article has provided a first systematic collection of the concepts and models that can now be assessed against the practical realities of implementation.

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Notes

[i] Integration and citizenship policy may also target immigrants' offspring born in the host state. All regional laws analysed here target third country nationals (i.e. non-EU citizens) residing in the region. Some laws additionally target residents from other EU countries (if provisions in the integration laws are more favourable than the status they enjoy otherwise), as well as natives whose parents were born abroad.

[ii] I use the terms 'national', 'state', and 'country' interchangeably to refer to the highest level of government. I use the terms 'regions' (Italy), 'autonomous communities' (Spain) or 'Länder' (Germany) to refer to the regional level of government. In multinational states, using the term 'national' is ambiguous, since we find groups conceiving of themselves as nations at the regional level. To delineate the difference, I qualify the latter as 'sub-state' or 'minority nations', and the regions they inhabit as 'minority regions'.

[iii] Italy has 20 regions. I treat the autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano (that constitute the region 'Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol') as separate cases, since the provinces hold the relevant legislative competencies. I use vernacular names of sub-state units throughout to ease the tracing of original sources.

[iv] These differences are often described in terms of 'ethnic' versus 'civic nationalism', but this emphasis on a categorical difference obscures the explanatory power of the *sequence* of state and community formation.

[v] It should be noted that *empirically*, national minorities in Europe differ from each other in terms of how narrowly they construct their group identity. Political elites in Scotland and Catalunya in particular are consciously avoiding ethnic constructions of the sub-state nation, emphasising shared social-democratic, egalitarian values (Scotland) or a shared linguistic and cultural identity (Catalunya) instead.

[vi] For an analysis of the integration *plans* of all Spanish ACs, see Iglesias de Ussel (2010). Henkes (2008) analyses headscarf legislation in all German *Länder*.

[vii] This holds regardless of whether regions have special or ordinary statutes in Italy, or whether they have special fiscal regimes or not in Spain.

[viii] Except for Basilicata that made a new law after the first round of coding had been finalized.

[ix] Regional laws in other policy domains (e.g. education, health, social housing) and whether (and in which way) regional autonomy statutes make reference to immigration and integration are topics for future research.

[x] Gesetz über den Aufenthalt, die Erwerbstätigkeit und die Integration von Ausländern im Bundesgebiet in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 25.02.2008 (BGBl. I, 2008, p. 162).

[xi] Results of the coding, data and replication code will be made available on the author's website upon publication of this article.

[xii] The description of the coding scheme in the appendix draws on Zuber (2014).

[xiii] Averages for Spain and Germany should be treated with care, since they are based on a small number of laws.

[xiv] Appendix D shows that the effect of minority nationalism is robust to the exclusion of Bavaria across all models.

[xv] Regional GDP data as of 1990 were kindly provided by Leonce Röth. GDP per capita for Italian regions before 1990 was taken from SVIMEZ (2000).

[xvi] Fixed effects take into account unobserved heterogeneity *between* countries. Ideally, one would add country-clustered standard errors to also account for potential interdependencies among regions *within* the same country. However, with only three clusters, the assumption of the number of clusters approaching infinity would be severely violated (Cameron & Miller, 2015, p. 318).

[xvii] To determine outliers, I plotted leverage and squared residuals of observations using stata's *lvr2plot* command and calculated DFITS statistics to summarise the graphical information from the leverage plots into a single statistic following Welsch & Kuh (1977).

[xviii] Bavaria's integration law was perceived by many as a law of exclusion, not integration. The Bavarian Social Democrats and Greens filed a case against the law at the Bavarian constitutional court, which is still pending.

Table 1. Results of OLS regression analyses of the content of regional integration laws

	Political-legal		Socio-economic				Cultural-religious			
	enabling	enabling	favourable	favourable	unfavour.	unfavour.	pluralist	pluralist	monist	monist
Minority nationalist	-0.167**	-0.152***	-0.342*	-0.344**	0.055*	0.053*	-0.195***	-0.184***	0.02	0.007
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Anti-immigrant	0.144*	0.078	0.289	0.248	0.074*	0.087*	0.069	0.019	0.057	0.103*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.22)	(0.17)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Right wing government	-2.114	-1.621	7.1	2.6	2.154∞	2.395*	-0.877	-0.289	0.511	-0.984
	(1.94)	(1.33)	(5.89)	(3.96)	(1.1)	(1.02)	(1.53)	(1.75)	(1.17)	(1.36)
Region left, nat. government right	3.704	4.288*	3.49	4.342	-1.045	-1.202	-2.12	-1.704	-2.709*	-2.987*
	(2.43)	(1.95)	(9.71)	(6.14)	(0.83)	(1.01)	(2.82)	(2.31)	(1.13)	(1.36)
Gdp per capita in 1000s	0.034	0.238*	-0.191	0.608*	0.053	-0.038	0.209*	0.332**	0.055	0.079
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.31)	(0.24)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.1)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Foreign-born population	0.284∞	0.305	1.242∞	0.307	-0.05	0.013	0.24	0.3	0.236∞	-0.008
	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.61)	(0.72)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.17)
Spain		-2.907		10.865		-0.3		-2.758		5.033∞
		(2.84)		(8.64)		(1.66)		(2.2)		(2.63)
Germany		-8.643**		-21.359***		2.959∞		-5.765*		2.006
		(2.96)		(5.32)		(1.42)		(2.09)		(2.31)
Constant	6.335**	3.849∞	16.850**	7.084	-1.378	-0.267	2.354	0.86	0	-0.298
	(2.01)	(2.01)	(4.35)	(4.13)	(0.82)	(0.66)	(1.37)	(1.5)	(1.16)	(0.9)
R^2 adj.	0.486	0.602	0.22	0.49	0.743	0.815	0.55	0.64	0.533	0.574
N	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26

∞ p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

No models were estimated for "restrictive" in the political legal domain, since there are only two occurrences of "restrictive" codings across all laws

Appendix for 'Explaining the immigrant integration laws of German, Italian and Spanish regions: Sub-state nationalism and multi-level party politics'

Christina Isabel Zuber

Appendix A. Figure A.1. Foreign-born residents in Italian, Spanish and German regions, 2001 and 2015

Germany

Share of Foreigners %

▲ 2001   × 2015

Sources:

Istituto nazionale di statistica (ISTAT) for Italy,

Instituto nacional de estadística (INE) for Spain,

Statistisches Bundesamt (DESTATIS) for Germany

Appendix B. Integration laws of Italian, Spanish and German regions

Table B.1. Integration laws of Italian regions 1975-2016.

Region	Date of law	Official title of law in Italian
Abruzzo 1	13 February 1990	Interventi a favore dei cittadini abruzzesi che vivono all'estero e dei cittadini extracomunitari che vivono in Abruzzo
Abruzzo 2	13 December 2004	Interventi a sostegno degli stranieri immigrati
Basilicata 1	13 April 1996	Interventi a sostegno dei lavoratori extracomunitari in Basilicata ed istituzione della commissione regionale dell'immigrazione
Basilicata 2	6 July 2016	Norme per l'accoglienza, la tutela e l'integrazione dei cittadini migranti e dei rifugiati
Bolzano*	28 October 2011	Integrazione delle cittadine e dei cittadini stranieri
Calabria	9 April 1990	Interventi regionali nel settore della emigrazione e della immigrazione.
Campania 1	10 March 1984	Interventi regionali nel settore della emigrazione e della immigrazione
Campania 2	3 November 1994	Interventi a sostegno dei diritti degli immigrati stranieri in Campania provenienti da paesi extracomunitari
Campania 3	8 February 2010	Norme per l'inclusione sociale, economica e culturale delle persone straniere presenti in Campania
Emilia-Romagna 1	21 February 1990	Iniziative regionali in favore dell'emigrazione e dell' immigrazione. Nuove norme per l'istituzione della consulta regionale dell'emigrazione e dell'immigrazione
Emilia-Romagna 2	24 March 2004	Norme per l'integrazione sociale dei cittadini stranieri immigrati
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 1	10 September 1990	Istituzione dell'Ente regionale per i problemi dei migranti
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 2	4 March 2005	Norme per l'accoglienza e l'integrazione sociale delle cittadine e dei cittadini stranieri immigrati
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 3	17 November 2015	Norme per l'integrazione sociale delle persone straniere immigrate
Lazio 1	24 November 1986	Interventi regionali nel settore dell'emigrazione e dell'immigrazione.
Lazio 2	16 February 1990	Provvidenze a favore degli immigrati extracomunitari
Lazio 3	14 July 2008	Disposizioni per la promozione e la tutela dell'esercizio dei diritti civili e sociali e la piena uguaglianza dei cittadini stranieri immigrati
Liguria	20 February 2007	Norme per l'accoglienza e l'integrazione sociale delle cittadine e dei cittadini stranieri immigrati
Lombardia	4 July 1988	Interventi a tutela degli immigrati extracomunitari in Lombardia e delle loro famiglie
Marche 1	27 February 1975	Provvidenze a favore dei lavoratori emigrati e immigrati e delle loro famiglie e costituzione della Consulta regionale dell'emigrazione e immigrazione
Marche 2	2 November 1988	Interventi a favore dei lavoratori emigrati ed immigrati e delle loro famiglie
Marche 3	2 March 1998	Interventi a sostegno dei diritti degli immigrati
Marche 4	5 January 1994	Interventi a favore degli emigrati, degli immigrati, dei rifugiati, degli apolidi, dei nomadi e delle loro famiglie.
Marche 5	26 May 2009	Disposizioni a sostegno dei diritti e dell'integrazione dei cittadini stranieri immigrati
Molise**		
Piemonte 1	6 July 1978	Interventi regionali in materia di movimenti migratori
Piemonte 2	9 January 1987	Interventi regionali in materia di movimenti migratori
Piemonte 3	08 November 1989	Interventi regionali a favore degli immigrati extra-comunitari residenti in Piemonte
Puglia 1	11 May 1990	Interventi a favore dei lavoratori extracomunitari in Puglia
Puglia 2	4 December 2009	Norme per l'accoglienza, la convivenza civile e l'integrazione degli immigrati in Puglia
Sardegna	24 December 1990	Norme di tutela di promozione delle condizioni di vita dei lavoratori extracomunitari in Sardegna
Sicilia**		
Toscana 1	22 March 1990	Interventi a sostegno dei diritti degli immigrati extracomunitari in Toscana
Toscana 2	8 June 2009	Norme per l'accoglienza, l'integrazione partecipe e la tutela dei cittadini stranieri nella Regione Toscana
Trento*	2 May 1990	Interventi nel settore dell'immigrazione straniera extracomunitaria
Umbria	10 April 1990	Interventi a favore degli immigrati extracomunitari
Valle d'Aosta	29 December 1995	Interventi per la promozione di servizi a favore di cittadini extracomunitari
Veneto 1	19 June 1984	Interventi regionali nel settore dell'emigrazione e dell'immigrazione
Veneto 2	30 January 1990	Interventi nel settore dell'immigrazione

Notes:
* denotes an autonomous province with the legislative power of a region;
** denotes a region that has so far not made a law addressing immigrant integration;
bold letters denote the document that was included in the analysis.

Source: own compilation triangulating between the following overviews:
http://www.forumcomunitastraniere.it/norme_regionali_immigrazione.htm
http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/Normativa/normativa_regionale/Pagine/default.aspx
http://www.seiugl.it/documenti/diritti%20vs%20discriminazioni/C_3_Normativa%20regionale%20sugli%20stranieri.pdf
http://www.superabile.it/web/it/Inail_per_l_integrazione_delle_persone_straniere/Normativa/Leggi_e_Circolari_Regionali/index.html http://www.issirfa.cnr.it

Table B.2: Integration laws of Spanish autonomous communities 2008-2013.

C. A.	Date of law	Official title of law in Spanish
Castilla y León	28 May 2013	Ley 3/2013, de 28 de mayo, de integración de los inmigrantes en la sociedad de Castilla y León.
Catalunya	07 May 2010	Ley 10/2010, de 7 de mayo, de acogida de las personas inmigradas y de las regresadas a Cataluña.
Valencia	05 December 2008	Ley 15/2008, de 5 de diciembre, de integración de las personas inmigrantes en la Comunitat Valenciana.

Source: own compilation, verifying that none of the other CC. AA. had laws by contacting the department responsible for immigration via e-mail or phone.

Table B.3: Integration laws of German Länder 2010-2015.

Land	Date of law	Official title of law in German
Baden-Württemberg	25 November 2015	Gesetz vom 25. November 2015, zur Verbesserung von Chancengerechtigkeit und Teilhabe in Baden-Württemberg Drucksache 15 / 7784
Bayern	13 December 2016	Bayerisches Integrationsgesetz (BayIntG) vom 13. Dezember 2016 (GVBl. S. 335) BayRS 26-6-A
Berlin	28 December 2010	Gesetz zur Regelung von Partizipation und Integration in Berlin, verkündet im Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt für Berlin am 28. Dezember 2010
Nordrhein-Westfalen	14 February 2012	Gesetz zur Förderung der gesellschaftlichen Teilhabe und Integration in Nordrhein-Westfalen (Teilhabe- und Integrationsgesetz) vom 14. Februar 2012

Source: own compilation, triangulated with Landtag Brandenburg (2016) and Forschungsbereich beim Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration (2017).

Appendix C. Coding procedure and coding frame for regional immigrant integration laws[1]

Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas (2016) argue that a continuum underlies outcomes in each of three domains of integration. I drew on their conceptual ideas to develop the individual categories operationalizing what inclusive and exclusive measures imply in each domain:

The **political-legal** domain refers to questions of residence, rights and status, as well as political participation. The poles of the political-legal continuum of integration outcomes are no rights, at one end of the spectrum, and full citizen rights at the other end.

Policies can thus intend to enable immigrants to achieve full political status, making them equal to citizens, or aim at restricting political rights and status. Regions in my cases do not have many competencies in this area. However, they can choose to help immigrants be more informed about the rights states award to them and they can establish institutions representing immigrants at the regional level. After the first round of coding, we added 'anti-racism' as an additional category in this domain. The addressees of anti-racism and anti-discrimination measures are not immigrants, but the autochtonous population, they therefore did not easily fit into the original categories that assume that integration policies target immigrants.

The **socio-economic** domain refers to questions of immigrants' access to labour markets, education and the welfare state. The continuum of outcomes differentiates *equal access* to e.g. housing, labour, education and health (i.e. treating immigrants in the same way as residents of the region who are citizens) on the one hand from *differential* treatment of immigrants and citizens on the other hand. I added additional categories to account for the fact that differential treatment can be *unfavourable* (e.g. making access to social benefits conditional on the duration of residency within the region), or

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[1] This description of the coding scheme draws on Zuber 2014. Coded documents are available from the author upon request.

favourable to immigrants, allowing them to compensate disadvantageous starting conditions (e.g. offering special vocational training). Differential favourable treatment counts as inclusive, whereas differential unfavourable counts as exclusive in this domain.

Finally, policies aiming to steer integration within the **cultural-religious** domain can fall between the extreme poles of *cultural-religious monism*, requiring immigrants to assimilate, and *cultural-religious pluralism*, fostering the diverse coexistence of cultures and religions on an equal basis. I additionally account for the fact that some of the regions included in my study are inhabited by a minority group with a cultural/linguistic identity that differs from the one propagated by the state (e.g. Valle d'Aosta or Bolzano). Cultural-religious monism can then either mean that immigrants should assimilate into the minority culture/religion (code: *monism, minority*), or the state-wide culture/religion (code: *monism, majority*). A further category of *dualism* was introduced to account for provisions that are monist in spirit, but conceive of the host culture itself as dualistic (e.g. Italian and German-speaking, and in fact also Ladin-speaking realities in the province of Bolzano). For example, the integration law of the province of Bolzano of 2011 defines 'knowledge of the official languages of the province' (article 1, para 3.b), rather than a single language, as a key goal.

Residual **neutral categories** were added in each domain, for measures that did not have a clearly interpretable direction. In addition, categories were added to code statements in the law that fit none of the integration categories this paper is substantively interested in, such as for example detailed provisions for how to coordinate the implementation of policies between different departments.

Each law was coded first independently by a student coder and myself. We then sat together and discussed all controversial codings with the goal of resolving most of them. The documents were segmented by grammatical sentence, respectively bullet point, if there were enumerations of measures separated by semi-colons. Using a *syntactical* coding unit has the advantage that identifying units to be coded can be done without engaging already with the meaning of the units. Meaning only comes into play when applying categories to the syntactically pre-defined units. We therefore do not have to worry about whether two coders identify the same units, but can focus our

reliability analysis on whether they apply the same categories to these units (Krippendorf 2004: 104-105). The coding was done in MAXQDA, a software designed to assist qualitative text analysis. Coders reduced the data through analytical categorization, applying the theoretical concepts from the same coding frame to all documents, thereby enabling cross-sectional retrieval of coded segments (see Spencer et al. 2009: 203-206).

Initial inter-coder reliability tests showed an average chance-corrected correspondence in the coding of individual segments of 0.65 for Italian laws, 0.53 for Spanish laws and 0.7 for German laws (Cohen's Kappa). The coders then sat together and discussed systematic discrepancies aiming to resolve controversies through re-coding and, where appropriate, the introduction of new codes (as in the case of anti-racism measures one coder had always coded under political-legal enabling, the other one under socio-economic, equal treatment). Through discussion and joint re-coding, most of the divergencies concerning the substantive policy categories could be resolved. After discussion and re-coding, Cohen's Kappa was 0.9 on average for Italian laws, 0.89 on average for Spanish laws and 0.91 for German laws. Where two interpretations remained equally plausible after discussion, divergent codings were kept. For the final dataset, the number of coded segments in each domain was therefore averaged across coders. A protocol of the coding discussions is available upon request.

Table C.1. Coding frame and coding manual as provided to coders

Coding frame immigrant integration laws	
Conceptual basis: The coding frame is based on Penninx' and Garcés-Mascareñas' conceptualization of integration processes and integration policies. See: Penninx, R., & Garcés-Mascareñas, B. (2016). The concept of integration as an analytical tool and as a policy concept. In R. Penninx & B. Garcés-Mascareñas (Eds.), *Integration Processes and Policies in Europe. Contexts, Levels and Actors* (pp. 11–29). IMISCOE, Cham: Springer.	
Coding unit: The default coding unit is a sentence. In case of enumerations, a coding unit is an enumerated item that has its own line, following a line-break. Preambles and headings are not to be coded.	

Code		**Memo**[2]
Overarching codes		
	Laws, residual	Statements that can not be coded under any of the integration categories, not even the integration generic one, since the statement has nothing to do with integration. Example: 'Adressaten der von diesem Gesetz vorgesehenen Maßnahmen sind:'
	Destinatari	Statements that define the characteristics of individuals or groups targeted by the law (in Italian: *Destinatari*). Example: '(1) Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund sind: 1. alle zugewanderten und nicht zugewanderten Ausländerinnen oder Ausländer, … '
	Administration, coordination	Use this for statements about how to manage integration on the administrative level in a procedural sense, who needs to coordinate with whom, how can tasks be fulfilled and who is in charge. Example: 'Die mit der Koordinierung der Immigration zusammenhängenden Aufgaben und Tätigkeiten werden mit Durchführungsverordnung geregelt.'
	Integration, generic	General references to integration and integration policy measures as such, that give no indication on which of the three sub-dimensions is at stake. Use only when there is no possibility to code into one of the three sub-dimensions of integration. Example: 'dass die Integration einen Prozess gegenseitigen Austausches und Dialogs darstellt …'

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[2] Since German was the shared language among all coders, all examples are from German laws. Translations of coding examples and MAXQDA project available upon request.

Integration, political-legal domain		Statements in the laws that define modalities/conditions for processes of integration in the political-legal dimension. Note that regions do not dispose of the relevant competencies to establish immigrants' political rights, but that nonetheless, they might and do include statements in their integration laws that seek to help migrants know about and make use of their legal and political rights and help them or make it harder for them to use the rights awarded to them by state legislation. According to Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas (2016: 14), the political-legal dimension of integration is understood in the following way: 'The legal-political dimension refers to residence and political rights and statuses. The basic question here is whether and to what extent immigrants are regarded as fully-fledged members of the political community. The position of an immigrant or the "degree of integration" has two extreme poles: on the one hand, there is the position of the irregular immigrant who is not part of the host society in the legal-political sense, though he may be integrated in the other two domains; on the other hand, there is the position of the immigrant who is (or has become) a national citizen. In between there is an enormous variation, which has increased in recent decades as a consequence of attempts of European states to "regulate" international migration and the new statuses and rights resulting from the European Union migration regime (among others, EU-nationals versus Third Country Nationals).'
	pol-leg, residual	Residual category for statements that refer to the domain of political-legal integration, but that are neither clearly enabling nor restrictive with regard to migrants' legal status and political rights as regional citizens, nor do they call for anti-racism or non-discrimination. Use only if statement fits none of the more concrete subcategories in this domain.
	pol-leg, restrictive	Use for statements that are aiming to restrict immigrants' political rights or make it harder for them to make use of the rights they have. Example: 'Haftungsansprüche wegen fehlerhafter Übersetzung gegen die Körperschaft, deren Behörde den Dolmetscher oder Übersetzer herangezogen hat, sind ausgeschlossen.'
	pol-leg, enabling	Use for statements that help immigrants become aware and make full use of the legal and political rights they are entitled to, e.g. inform them about their rights, include them in participatory practices at the regional level, ensure their representation in regional institutions. Example: 'Die oder der Beauftragte des Senats von Berlin für Integration und Migration ist Ansprechpartnerin oder Ansprechpartner für Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund und unterstützt sie bei der Durchsetzung ihrer Rechte.'
	pol-leg, anti-racism	Statements in the laws that define goals or measures targeting not the immigrants, but the host population, motivating the host population to not discriminate immigrants on the basis of their culture, ethnicity, race, or religion. Include here the establishment of anti-racism observatories and all anti-discrimination measures. Example: 'Ziel dieses Gesetzes ist […] 2. jede Form von Rassismus und Diskriminierung einzelner Bevölkerungsgruppen zu bekämpfen,'
Integration, socio-economic domain		Statements in the laws that define modalities/conditions for processes of integration in the socio-economic dimension. According to Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas (2016: 15), the socio-economic dimension of integration is understood in the following way: 'The socio-economic dimension refers to the social and economic position of residents, irrespective of national citizenship. Under this dimension, the position of immigrants can be analysed by looking at their access to and participation in domains that are crucial for any resident: do immigrants have (equal) access to institutional facilities to find work, housing, education and health facilities? Do they use these facilities? What is the outcome of immigrants' participation as compared to natives (with the same or comparable qualifications)? Since needs and aspirations in these domains are relatively universal (basic needs which do not depend on cultural factors), access to and participation of immigrants and natives in these areas can be measured comparatively. The outcomes (particularly when they are unequal) can be used as input for policies.'

	soc-eco, residual	Residual category for statements that refer to the domain of socio-economic integration but that imply neither an equalizing nor a differentiated approach to access to housing, employment, education, health and any other services that the region might offer. Use only if statement fits none of the more concrete subcategories in this domain. Example: 'Zur schulischen Integration ausländischer Schülerinnen und Schüler sowie Studierender ergreift das Land über die Bildungsressorts folgende Maßnahmen:'
	soc-eco, equal treatment	For statements that speak of immigrants equal access to services provided by the regional government and administration, that see the newcomer as equal to the autochtonous population imposing no special conditions (neither positive nor negative) for accessing services. Include here statements about non-discrimination measures. Do not include positive discrimination, use 'differential favourable' for positive discrimination/affirmative action instead. Example: 'der Zugang für die ausländischen Bürgerinnen und Bürger aus Nicht-Eu-Staaten zu den auf dem gesamten Staatsgebiet vorgesehenen Grundleistungen'
	soc-eco, differential unfavourable	Statements that define differential access of immigrants to social services employment, housing, education health, or in case differential services are needed / to be set up specifically for newcomers. Code unfavourable, if the intention of the statement in the law is to restrict access of immigrants to public services at regional level, making it harder for the immigrant than for other citizens to access services. Example: 'Für den Zugang zu Leistungen finanzieller Art müssen ausländische Bürgerinnen und Bürger aus Nicht-Eu-Staaten einen mindestens fünfjährigen ununterbrochenen Wohnsitz und ständigen Aufenthalt in Südtirol nachweisen'
	soc-eco, differential favourable	Statements that define differential access of immigrants to social services employment, housing, education health, or in case differential services needed / to be set up. Code differential favourable if the policy aims at a differential treatment of the immigrant, but where the intention behind the policy is to enable the immigrant to ultimately achieve equal conditions e.g. special language support in schools, training courses about job market. Note that your interpretative skills as a coder are required to tell differential favourable from differential unfavourable. Example: 'Das Land betreibt Informationskampagnen für die Zielgruppe dieses Gesetzes, um zu gewährleisten, dass dieser Personenkreis effektiv Zugang zu den Gesundheitsdiensten findet.'
Integration, cultural-religious domain		Statements in the laws that define modalitities/conditions for processes of integration in the cultural-religious dimension. According to Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas (2016: 15), the cultural-religious dimension of integration is understood in the following way: 'The cultural-religious dimension pertains to the domain of perceptions and practices of immigrants and the receiving society as well as their reciprocal reactions to difference and diversity. If newcomers see themselves as different and are perceived by the receiving society as culturally or religiously different, they may aspire to acquire a recognized place in these respects. On their turn, the receiving society may or may not accept cultural or religious diversity. Here again we find two extremes: on the one hand, new diversity may be rejected and immigrants may be required to adapt and assimilate into mono-cultural/religious societies; on the other hand, there may be a practice of accepting ethnic identities, cultures and world views on an equal level in pluralistic societal systems. Between these two extremes there are many in-between-positions, such as accepting certain forms of diversity in the private realm but not, or only partly, in the public realm.'
	cul, residual	Residual category for statements that refer to the domain of cultural-religious integration but that do not fit into a clear model as specified in the other subcategories (pluralism, monism etc). Use only if statement fits none of the more concrete subcategories in this domain. Example: 'Das Land fördert und realisiert Maßnahmen zur Unterstützung der sprachlichen und kulturellen Integration ausländischer Bürgerinnen und Bürger.'

	cul, pluralism	Statements indicating acceptance or even promotion of all identities, cultures, religions, and languages in a pluralistic society. Example: '(1) An jeweils einem Tag der religiösen Feiertage Opfer- fest, Fest des Fastenbrechens und Aschura haben Beschäftigte islamischen Glaubens das Recht, zum Besuch des Gottesdienstes vom Dienst oder von der Arbeit fernzubleiben.'
	cul, dualism	Statements that demand integration into a dual host culture and language, the minority and the majority one (i.e. Catalan and Spanish in Catalunya and German and Italian in South Tyrol, respectively) or allow free choice of whether to integrate into either of the two cultures and languages. So the model is culturally plural, but only with regard to the autochtonous cultures, therefore called dualism, not pluralism, which is its own category. Example: 'Neben der Förderung der Sprachkompetenz in den Landessprachen Deutsch, Italienisch und Ladinisch'
	cul, monism minority	Statements that demand integration into a single regional/minority host culture and language conceived of as monist. In the case of regions with a strong minority identity (i.e. Catalan) this refers to the minority culture and language (Catalan). Code if a model of integration into the minority/regional language and/or culture is mentioned. Example: 'El servei de primera acollida ha d'oferir la formació i els mitjans necessaris per a adquirir les competències bàsiques en llengua catalana a les persones titulars del dret d'accés al servei que no la coneguin'
	cul, monism majority	Statements that demand integration exclusively into a single host culture and language conceived as monist, in this case the majority one (i.e. Spanish and Italian respectively). Code if a model of integration into the majority language and/or culture is mentioned. Example: 'Der Staat fördert an der Leitkultur ausgerichtete Angebote, die Migrantinnen und Migranten in politischer Bildung, deutscher Geschichte einschließlich der Lehren aus den Verbrechen des Dritten Reiches und in der Rechtskunde unterweisen und ihnen die heimische Kultur, Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsordnung näherbringen.'

Appendix D. Robustness checks and summary statistics

Table D.1. Regression analyses exc. Bavaria to see if results for *minority nationalist* are robust to definition of the CSU as minority nationalist

	Political-legal		Socio-economic				Cultural-religious			
	enabling	enabling	favourable	favourable	unfavour.	unfavour.	pluralist	pluralist	monist	monist
Minority nationalist	-0.158**	-0.152***	-0.324*	-0.344**	0.049*	0.052*	-0.190***	-0.184***	0.012	0.005
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Anti-immigrant	0.176**	0.092	0.354	0.229	0.052*	0.054∞	0.090	0.027	0.027	0.032
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Right wing government	-1.300	-1.517	8.731	2.462	1.606∞	2.152*	-0.353	-0.230	-0.254	-1.489∞
	(1.6)	(1.33)	(5.49)	(3.95)	(0.81)	(1.03)	(1.39)	(1.70)	(0.95)	(0.73)
Region left, nat. government right	2.828	4.023∞	1.734	4.692	-0.455	-0.586	-2.685	-1.854	-1.885∞	-1.706**
	(2.41)	(2.06)	(9.78)	(6.29)	(0.56)	(0.70)	(2.78)	(2.54)	(0.99)	(0.57)
Gdp per capita in 1000s	0.120	0.242*	-0.019	0.603*	-0.005	-0.047	0.264**	0.334**	-0.025	0.060∞
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.35)	(0.23)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.1)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Foreign-born population	0.187	0.273	1.048	0.350	0.015	0.088	0.178	0.282	0.327*	0.149
	(0.12)	(0.20)	(0.63)	(0.74)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Spain		-2.506		10.334		-1.233		-2.531		3.092*
		(3.17)		(8.98)		(1.35)		(2.45)		(1.13)
Germany		-7.860*		-22.398**		1.132		-5.320∞		-1.794∞
		(3.67)		(6.52)		(1.04)		(2.84)		(0.88)
Constant	4.840*	3.694∞	13.854**	7.290∞	-0.371	0.094	1.391	0.772	1.406*	0.453
	(2.09)	(2.00)	(4.66)	(4.17)	(0.51)	(0.49)	(1.33)	(1.5)	(0.64)	(0.52)
R² adj.	0.516	0.566	0.255	0.471	0.662	0.684	0.583	0.619	0.499	0.671
N	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25

∞ p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

No models were estimated for "restrictive" in the political legal domain, since there are only two occurrences of "restrictive" codings across all laws

Table D.2. Regression analyses excluding cases identified as influential outliers

	Socio-economic		Cultural-religious					
	unfavour.	unfavour.	monist	monist	monist	monist	monist	monist
	excl. Bavaria	excl. Bavaria	excl. Bavaria	excl. Bavaria	excl. Bolzano	excl. Bolzano	excl. Bav. & Bol.	excl. Bav. & Bol.
Minority nationalist	0.049*	0.052*	0.012	0.005	0.058	0.047	0.024	-0.021
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Anti-immigrant	0.052*	0.054∞	0.027	0.032	0.083**	0.102*	0.04	0.005
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Right wing government	1.606∞	2.152∞	-0.254	-1.489∞	1.467	0.552	0.165	-2.678∞
	(0.81)	(1.03)	(0.95)	(0.73)	(0.9)	(0.96)	(1.06)	(1.51)
Region left, nat. government right	-0.455	-0.586	-1.885∞	-1.706**	-2.516*	-2.680*	-1.986∞	-1.422*
	(0.56)	(0.7)	(0.99)	(0.57)	(0.93)	(1.09)	(0.95)	(0.65)
Gdp per capita in 1000s	-0.005	-0.047	-0.025	0.060∞	0.037	0.055	-0.015	0.068∞
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Foreign-born population	0.015	0.088	0.327*	0.149	0.223∞	0.095	0.306*	0.142
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.1)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.09)
Spain		-1.233		3.092*		2.646		3.910*
		(1.35)		(1.13)		(1.73)		(1.67)
Germany		1.132		-1.794∞		0.933		-2.533*
		(1.04)		(0.88)		(1.57)		(0.98)
Constant	-0.371	0.094	1.406*	0.453	-0.186	-0.362	1.086	0.778
	(0.51)	(0.49)	(0.64)	(0.52)	(0.74)	(0.78)	(0.75)	(0.51)
R^2 adj.	0.662	0.684	0.499	0.671	0.714	0.702	0.472	0.686
N	25	25	25	25	25	25	24	24

∞ p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001, robust standard errors in parentheses

Table D.3. Summary statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min (N for dummies)	Max (N for dummies)
Dependent					
enabling	26	9.808	6.351	1.5	30.5
favourable	26	22.462	13.906	0.5	49
unfavourable	26	1.308	3.181	0	13.5
pluralist	26	6.577	4.623	0	17
monist	26	2.846	3.152	0	14.5
Independent					
minatseat	26	10.243	20.929	0	74.3
antimseat	26	14.949	18.757	0	62.857
govright	26	0.192	0.402	0 (21)	1 (5)
regleftnatright	26	.308	.471	0 (18)	1 (8)
gdppct_l	26	22.589	10.341	6.237	42.950
foreign_l	26	5.375	4.943	0.15	16.89
spain	26	0.115	0.326	0 (23)	1 (3)
germany	26	0.154	0.368	0 (22)	1 (4)

Appendix E. Table E.1. Minority nationalist vote and seat shares

cntry	region	datelaw	election	minnat party	vote	seat	minatvote	minatseat
ES	Castilla y León	05/2013	2007	Unión del Pueblo Leonés	2.73	2.41	2.73	2.41
ES	Catalunya	05/2010	2006	Convergència i Unió	32.18	35.56	46.21	51.11
ES	Catalunya	05/2010	2006	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya	14.03	15.56		
ES	Valencia	12/2008	2007	Unió Valenciana	0.95	0	0.95	0
IT	Abruzzo	12/2004	2000	.	0	0	0	0
IT	Basilicata	04/1996	1995	.	0	0	0	0
IT	Bolzano	10/2011	2008	Südtiroler Volkspartei	48.10	51.43	69.60	74.30
IT	Bolzano	10/2011	2008	Südtiroler Freiheit	4.90	5.71		
IT	Bolzano	10/2011	2008	Union für Südtirol	2.3	2.86		
IT	Bolzano	10/2011	2008	Die Freiheitlichen	14.3	14.3		
IT	Calabria	04/1990	1985	.	0	0	0	0
IT	Campania	02/2010	2005	.	0	0	0	0
IT	Emilia Romagna	03/2004	2000	Lega Nord	3.31	2	3.31	2
IT	Friuli Venezia Giulia	11/2015	2013	Lega Nord	8.27	6.12	8.27	6.12
IT	Lazio	07/2008	2005	.	0	0	0	0
IT	Liguria	02/2007	2005	Lega Nord	4.67	2.5	4.67	2.5
IT	Lombardia	07/1988	1985	Lega Lombarda-Liga Veneta	0.46	0	0.46	0
IT	Marche	05/2009	2005	Lega Nord	0.87	0	0.87	0
IT	Piemonte	11/1989	1985	Piemont-Liga Veneta	1.13	0	1.13	0
IT	Puglia	12/2009	2005	.	0	0	0	0
IT	Sardegna	12/1990	1989	Partito Sardo d'Azione	12.37	12.5	12.37	12.5
IT	Toscana	06/2009	2005	.	0	0	0	0
IT	Trento	05/1990	1988	Partito Autonomista Trentino Tirolese	9.85	8.57	9.85	8.57
IT	Umbria	04/1990	1985	Union Valdôtaine	0.4	0	0.4	0
IT	Valle d'Aosta	12/1995	1993	Union Valdôtaine	37.3	37.14	44.89	45.71
IT	Valle d'Aosta	12/1995	1993	Lega Nord	7.59	8.57		
IT	Veneto	01/1990	1985	Lega Nord-Liga Veneta	5.91	5	5.91	5
DE	Baden-Württemberg	11/2015	2011	.	0	0	0	0
DE	Bayern	12/2016	2013	Christlich-Soziale Union	47.7	56.11	49.8	56.11
DE	Bayern	12/2016	2013	Bayernpartei	2.1	0		
DE	Berlin	12/2010	2006	.	0	0	0	0
DE	Nordrhein-Westfalen	02/2012	2012	.	0	0	0	0

Note: Classification of parties following Massetti and Schakel (2016, Appendix A Table A1). Massetti and Schakel exclude CSU Bavaria because of its permanent electoral alliance with the state-wide Christian Conservatives. I include it because despite the alliance, it has a Bavarian minority nationalist profile (see Hepburn's 2008 analysis). Results for the effect of minority nationalism are robust to the exclusion of Bavaria (see C1). Regional election results and seat shares were kindly provided by Leonce Röth (Röth & Kaiser 2018).

Appendix F. Table F.1. Anti-immigrant vote and seat shares

cntry	region	datelaw	election	anti-immigrant parties	vote	seat	antimvote	antimseat
ES	Castilla y León	05/2013	2007	.	0	0	0	0
ES	Catalunya	05/2010	2006	.	0	0	0	0
ES	Valencia	12/2008	2007	.	0	0	0	0
IT	Abruzzo	12/2004	2000	MS-FT	1.29	0	1.29	0
IT	Basilicata	04/1996	1995	MSI / AN	12.04	13.33	12.60	13.11
IT	Basilicata	04/1996	1995	MS-FT	0.56	0		
IT	Bolzano	10/2011	2008	Lega Nord	2.10	2.86	58.50	62.86
IT	Bolzano	10/2011	2008	UDC / CCD	1.2	0		
IT	Bolzano	10/2011	2008	PDL	8.30	8.57		
IT	Bolzano	10/2011	2008	SVP	48.10	51.43		
IT	Calabria	04/1990	1985	MSI / AN	6.38	5.00	6.38	5.00
IT	Campania	02/2010	2005	AN	10.58	13.33	29.27	38.33
IT	Campania	02/2010	2005	FI	11.94	13.33		
IT	Campania	02/2010	2005	UDC/CCD	6.75	6.67		
IT	Emilia Romagna	03/2004	2000	Lega Nord	3.31	2.00	3.31	2.00
IT	Friuli Venezia Giulia	11/2015	2015	Lega Nord	8.30	6.38	8.30	6.38
IT	Lazio	07/2008	2005	AN	16.93	15.71	40.13	34.29
IT	Lazio	07/2008	2005	FI	15.35	12.86		
IT	Lazio	07/2008	2005	UDC	7.85	5.71		
IT	Liguria	02/2007	2005	Lega Nord	4.67	2.50	34.78	27.50
IT	Liguria	02/2007	2005	AN	7.15	5.00		
IT	Liguria	02/2007	2005	FI	19.69	17.50		
IT	Liguria	02/2007	2005	UDC	3.27	2.50		
IT	Lombardia	07/1988	1985	MSI / AN	5.90	5.00	5.90	5.00
IT	Marche	05/2009	2005	Lega Nord	0.87	0	39.05	40.00
IT	Marche	05/2009	2005	AN	12.93	12.50		
IT	Marche	05/2009	2005	FI	17.99	20.00		
IT	Marche	05/2009	2005	UDC	7.26	7.50		
IT	Piemonte	11/1989	1985	MSI / AN	5.50	5.00	5.50	5.00
IT	Puglia	12/2009	2005	AN	12.10	10.00	37.69	31.43
IT	Puglia	12/2009	2005	FI	17.80	15.71		
IT	Puglia	12/2009	2005	UDC	7.79	5.71		
IT	Sardegna	12/1990	1989	MSI / AN	3.50	3.75	3.50	3.75
IT	Toscana	06/2009	2005	Lega Nord	1.27	0	31.73	32.31
IT	Toscana	06/2009	2005	AN	10.88	10.77		

IT	Toscana	06/2009	2005	FI	17.19	16.92		
IT	Toscana	06/2009	2005	UDC	3.66	4.62		
IT	Trento	05/1990	1988	MSI / AN	6.50	7.14	6.50	7.14
IT	Umbria	04/1990	1985	MSI / AN	6.30	6.70	6.30	6.70
IT	Valle d'Aosta	12/1995	1993	MSI / AN	1.71	0.00	9.31	8.57
IT	Valle d'Aosta	12/1995	1993	Lega Nord	7.60	8.57		
IT	Veneto	01/1990	1985	MSI / AN	4.50	3.30	4.50	3.30
DE	Baden-Württemberg	11/2015	2011	NPD	0,97	0	0.97	0.00
DE	Bayern	12/2016	2013	CSU	47.70	56.00	48.30	56.00
DE	Bayern	12/2016	2013	NPD	0.60	0		
DE	Berlin	12/2010	2006	.	0	0	0	0
DE	Nordrhein-Westfalen	02/2012	2012	NPD	0.70	0	0.70	0

Note: Classification of parties following van Spanje (2011) and the criterion that a party with a position larger than or equal to 8 on an immigration scale ranging from 0 (liberal) to 10 (restrictive immigration policy) is an anti-immigrant party. For 1990-2004 classification of parties is taken directly from van Spanje (2011). For 2004-2014, classification of parties was based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, expert answers to questions about immigration and multiculturalism versus assimilation, again using a position larger than or equal to 8 as the benchmark (Bakker et. al., 2015; Polk et. al., 2017). Regional election results and seat shares were kindly provided by Leonce Röth (Röth & Kaiser 2018).

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